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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUS CHOURNOS and 
VEVE CHOURtWS, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs CASE NO. 17362 
and Appel I ants, 
v. 
NICK D'AGNILLO, et ux., 
Defendants ) 
and Respondents. ) 
______ .:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:..:_.:..:_.:_.:_.:_.:_.:__· _· ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT"OF'TflE'Kl!\IO·op·cASE 
Appel I ants filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 
to establish a right-of-way be prescription in the Appel-
!ants as against the Defendants and Respondents. 
DISPOSITION. IN' LOWER" COORT 
The Lower Court granted Judgment to the Respondents 
quieting title of Respondents, and denied to Appellants a 
right-of-way by prescription, and further denying to the 
Appellants' Motion for a new trial. 
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~§~i§f.:.2Q~2~!_Q~-~~~EAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the Judgment of the Lm:. 
Court in denying Declaratory Judgr.ient to the Appel !ants, ~ 1 
further to seek as an alternative thereto that this Co": 
grant to the Appel !ants the right of new trial or upon co:. 
sideration of the evidence before the Court, and the tota 
record, grant Judgment to the Appellants. 
STATEMENT.OF.FACTS 
The Appel !ants are owners of property contiguous 
that of the Respondents, and claim a right-of-way b: 
prescription, by reason of continued use of right-of-wayb, 
the Appel !ants' and by the prior owners of the proper\: 
acquired by the Appellants for a period substantially ir. 
excess of twenty (20) years, during which there was an open, 
notorious and adverse use of the right-of-way. 
The Respondents' property was conveyed from a Becker to 
Giuseppe D'Agnillo and his wife in December, 1939, and ir 
the description of the property, there was excepted from thi 
conveyance to D'Agnillo, the following described property 
to-wit: 
Excepting a right-of-way 14 feet wide, the 
center line of which is described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 567.6 feet North and 
North 88°34' West 167.2 feet from the South-
• er 
east Quarter (SE 1/4) Section, and rurn: 1 nl 
thence North 1034 feet, as same is descr 1 ~~ 1 
and accepted in Deed recorded August • 
1911, in Book 67 of Deeds, at Page 278. 
2 
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6P). The same property was again con-
veyed in April, 1949, by Giuseppe D'Agnillo to his wife, 
containing the exception of the 14-foot wife right-of-
wuy. (Exhibit 7P) 
A conveyance was made then by the wife Maria D'Agnillo 
to herself and a Nicola D'Agnillo as joint tenants on 
i'larch 23, 1959, and contained therein the exception to the 
right-of-way of 14 feet. (Plaintiff's Exhibit BP) 
A Warranty Deed conveyed the property from Maria and 
Nicola D'Agnillo to Maria D'Agnillo and Nicola D'Agnillo on 
Apri 1 10, 1975, giving each a one-half interest as tenants-
in-cor.unon, and containing an exception of 14 feet for a 
right-of-way. (R 25) 
The conveyance was made by Maria D'Agnillo, as a widow, 
to Nicola D'Agnillo, the Respondent herein, Joseph D'Agnillo 
and John D'Agnillo, the same property, again subject to the 
existing right-of-way of 14 feet, which conveyance was made 
also on April 10, 1975, (R 26), and subsequent thereto, a 
Warranty Deed conveyed the property from Nicola D'Agnillo 
and his wife, Mari a D' Agni 11 o, to Nicola D'Agnillo, 
.Joseph ~1. D'Agnillo, and John D'Agnillo, as joint trustees 
for Grnntor, under a Trust Agreement dated April 10, 1975, 
wherein Nicola D'Agnillo was the Truster, and again made the 
property subject to the existing right-of-way of 14 
feet. CR 27) The record contained in the transcript of 
!<est imony shows that a Warner purchased the property in 
3 
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1951, and used it for r:1otor vehicle repairs, and that br,· 
\Varner and his customers used the right-of-way. (T !if 
There were a succession of tenants, commencing in 19oi 
which evidenced that there was no fence across the righ; 
of-way, and that people used the right-of-way for ingress 
and egress, loading and unloading, and parking. (R 10'· 
• 
109, 110) That as a matter of fact, one Stephens used th' 
property from 1944 to 1951, and that the right-of-way"'' 
used. (T 111) That there was no fence existing, nor wen 
any of the successive tenants, except the Appellant, eve: 
restricted from the use of the 14-foot right-of-way. 
(T 112, 113, 114, 115, 120, 122, 123) 
The Appel !ant was the tenant of the dominent estat• 
commencing in 1964, and both he and his customers used th1 
14-foot right-of-way. (T 136) The record further evidence' 
that the present tenant and owner, Appellant, of the adjoin· 
ing property used the 14-foot right-of-way, not only fro'. 
1964, but subsequent thereto when he purchased the propertr 
in 1969; anct that at all times made use of the 14-foot right 
of-way for the purpose of loading and unloading to his place 
of business, as we I I as for personal and cus torner 
parking. (T 131-139) 
The record reveals that tl1ere was a continued existence 
of the right-of-way since 1911, and a continuous use of the 
right-of-way by owners of the property 
4 
ct bl presently owne · 
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the AL)pellants fro;n 1944, until the property was fenced off 
by the Respondents in 1977, and that at no time until the 
erection of the fence by the Respondents was any objection 
1~acle to the open and notorious use of the property by the 
successive owners of the dominant estate over the servient 
estate, and all such use was open, notorious and adverse 
without objection or consent of the Respondents or their 
predecessors in ownership of the servient estate. 
The current action before the Court was brought by the 
Appellants against the Respondents in a suit filed 
September 14, 1978, in the Lower Court, seeking Declaratory 
Judgment as to the right of the Appellants to the continued 
use of the right-of-way by right of prescription. 
ARGOMEN'l' 
POINT I. 
APPELLANTS ACQUIRED A RIGHT-OF-WAY BY PRESCRIPT ION 
AS AGAINST RESPONDENTS. 
The record stated in the Statement of Facts, clearly 
shows that the Respondents at all time conveyed and received 
the property which they owned contiguous to the property 
ownerl by the Appellants, and at all times since 1911, an 
except ion was made in each conveyance as to the 14-foot 
right-of-way, which is in question before the Court, and is 
the property over which the Appellants claim a right-of-way 
bv prcsc l~tion. 
5 
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held: 
I n ~'.:?..!..!.~~~~i: v . £~~~~ , 1 7 5 P • 2 d 7 14 ( 1 9 4 G ) , th i s Cour 
Where a claimant (to an easement) has 
shown an open and continuous (and 
interupted) use of the land for the 
prescriptive period (20 years in Utah), 
the use wi 11 be presumed to have been 
against the owner and the owner of the 
servient estate, to prevent the 
prescriptive easement from arising, has 
a burden of showing that the use was 
under him instead of against him. 
There is no evidence in the record which tends 
the presumption of adverse use by the Appellants, 
to rebutl 
and th~ 
Appellants' predecessors. 
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that any 
of the users of the 14-foot right-of-way made use of said 
right-of-way under the Respondents or their predecessors, 
If the Respondents· ever had any claim as against the 
14-foot right-of-way, it was never established by any use 
made by the Respondents or their predecessors, and that no 
evidence was presented to show that at any time the Respon· 
dents culivated or made any constant use of the 14-foot 
right-of-way, and the claim of the Respondents, if it is to 
exist at all, would require the establishr.ient by the Respon· 
dents of the fact that they had some basis for claim ol 
right to the 14-foot right-of-way (notwithstanding the con· 
tinuous exclusion of said right-of-way from lands conveyed 
to the Respondents and their predecessors), or that the 
Respondents had somehow establisheci by adverse position or 
6 
I 
I 
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prescriptive use, the right to the 14-foot right-of-way, and 
hnd subsequently consented to allow the use of saoe by the 
Appel Inn ts and their predecessors of which the record is 
entirely bare of any such claim. 
In ~~lll~f?±E. v. fra~~. ~~EE.'.:• the Court held that the 
nature of the use necessary to give rise to a prescriptive 
easement would be evidenced by showing that the use was 
against the owner, as distinguised from under the owner. 
The Court, in adopting the rule, stated in Thompson£!! Rea.!_ 
~ro£~E.!r· ~ec.!_l£~~l~!· ~01_;_~.!_. E_;_~~~· and in ~±ctio~~~. 
~~~~~~~!~ !~~~~E~~~!· that the rule is: 
The prevailing rule is that where a claimant 
has shown an open, visible, continuous, and 
unmolested use of land for the period of time 
sufficient to acquire an easement by adverse 
user, the use wi 11 be presumed to be under a 
claim of right. The owner of the servient 
estate, in order to avoid the acquistion of 
an easement by pre script ion, has the burden 
of rebutting this presumption by showing that 
the use was permissive. 
The Supreme Court adopted the rule to be: 
We think the better rule is that des-
cribed as the prevailing rule in the 
above question. That is where a 
claimant has shown an open and continu-
ous use of the land for a prescriptive 
period ( 20 years in Utah) the use wi 11 
be presumed to have been against the 
owner, and the owner of this servient 
estate to prevent the prescriptive ease-
r.ient from arising has the burden of 
showing that the use was under him 
instead of against him. 
7 
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In Qllk Cottonwood Tanner Ditch ~~~E~i.:z v. !lay;. 
---------- ----- ~ 
159 p. 2d 5 9 6' (on rehearing) 174 p. 2d 148, 155, where F 
Court ~tated: 
It is true that to establish an easement the 
use must be notorious and continous, and on 
this adverseness -that is, holding against 
the owner - will be presumed. 
None of the conveyances of the property as set fort 
herein from 1911 to the instant owners of the servien 
estate conveyed the property without excepting from the cor .. 
veyance, the 14-foot right-of-way in question. 
This Court further held in the~~.!_.!_!._~~~.!::_ case, that th 
conveyance of the servient estate, in and of itself durin: 
the descriptive period, does not interrupt the running o' 
that time (prescriptive acquisition). 
In Dahnken v. 18 4 P. 2d 211, the 
Court held at p. 215, the adoption of the ~ol.!_j_ng~E rule for 
the adoption of the rule in ~ol.!_j_~~~E_, ~up.!::_~, of the manne: 
in which a use wi 11 be presumed to have been against th€ 
owner, and that the burden was on the servient estate to 
show that such use was under instead of against the servient 
estate. 
It is submitted that there is no evidence in the recorc 
to rebut the presumption of adverse use by the Appellants, 
d al1d O\"ncrshir) of the property of the nor by the pre ecessors ' 
Appellants. 
8 
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In ~i..'.:!2!:i:~~ v. Pines ~an~!2~ !_nc~. 559 P.2d 948 (1977), 
tl1is Court held: 
The 
A right-of-way by prescription is estab-
1 ished by open, notorious, adverse use 
thereof for a period of 20 years. Once 
the adverse use is established for the 
20-year period, the burden is showing 
that it was not adverse as upon the 
owner of the servient estate. 
Court further held in the Richards case, 
It would seem that his Honor also erred 
in thinking that the adverse use had to 
be regular. All that is required is 
that the use be as often as is required 
by the owner of the dominent estate. 
While the use made could limit the 
future use, it does not entirely prevent 
a prescriptive use to cross the defen-
dant's land. 
It is submitted to the Court that the Appellants herein 
do not claim title to the land by adverse possession, but 
they do claim a prescriptive easement in and over the land 
in question and for which the land has been used, namely the 
p:irking of motor vehicles, use for ingress and egress and 
use for loading and unloading merchandise to the premises of 
the dominant estate, and that the use of the property of the 
scrvicnt estate has been for over 20 years, and that all 
such use was as against any claim of the Respondents and was 
not with consent of the Respondents, nor have the Respon-
dents evidenced any claim to title to said property, except 
by the recent erection of a fence to exclude the Respondents 
ft'rn11 us•~ of said property. 
9 
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This Court held in Annerson v. 
32, 504 P.2d 1000 (1972): 
The assumption, however, that one cannot 
acquire an interest in property by 
adverse possession when the le~al owner 
pays the taxes thereon is erroneous. 
One will not be able to acquire a title 
to the property, without complying with 
the statutory provisions relating to 
adverse possession, but that does not 
preclude interest from attachinP" after 
an adverse use for 20 years. 
0 
...... 
In the instant matter before the Court, the fence wa 
erected in 1977, by the Respondents, and this Court heldi 
~2.~~2.~~· ~!. ~~~~~tr~!!_~, 412 P.2d 314 (1966), that the us 
of a strip jointly established and used by landowners fo 
more than 40 years as a common driveway, constituted a 
open, notorious, continuous and adverse use for more than i 
years, and that a prescriptive right to continued use wa 
established. 
The 
follows: 
Court stated in the flichins case, 
It is our opinion that a reasonable con-
clusion to be drawn from the facts here 
shown, were the parties (predecessers) 
jointly established and used a driveway 
on what they thought their common boun-
dary is that the use meets the require-
ments of being open, notorious, continu-
ous and adverse years for more than 20 
years, and therefore has established a 
prescriptive right to continue to so use 
it. 
10 
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PO lllT I I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RE-OPENING TRIAL FOR THE 
PUllPOSE OF TAKING TESTIMONY OR FOR ALLOWING OF NEW 
TIUAL REQUIRED BY SURPRISE TESTIMONY. 
The Appellant made a motion for new trial and/or motion 
to re-open for further evidence, based upon testimony made 
by witness for the Respondent that a previous occupier of 
the dominant estate (Appellants' property) had placed tele-
phone poles as a barrier to prevent use of the 14-foot 
right-of-way. 
During all of the discovery made by the Appellants and 
in depositions taken prior to trial, no allegation or claim 
was made as to such placing of such telephone poles by Ray 
Hansen. 
The witness for Respondents further gave testimony at 
time of trial as to an alleged conversation between the 
witness and Ray Hansen. Prior to trial date, the counsel 
for Appellants advised the counsel for Respondents that Ray 
Hansen would be a witness, but at time of trial, Ray Hansen 
was totally disabled and unable to physically appear as a 
witness, and the Appellants without knowledge of the testi-
mony of Respondent's witness as to an alleged conversation 
of 'Ir. Hansen in the placing of poles as a barrier to use of 
the 14-foot right-of-way, and not knowing that such a claim 
would be a matter in issue, and proceeded to trial. 
11 
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At time of motion of Appellants for new trial or 
re-opening of trial for the purpose of taking the testimony 
of Mr. Hansen, an Affidavit of Mr. Hansen was attached 
thereto which was totally contradictory to the testimony ol 
Respondents' witness and in denial of the allegations made 
by the Respondents' witness. 
The Court, in its Finding of Fact, upon which the Court 
granted Judgment and Decree quieting title in favor of the 
Respondents, relies substantially upon the testimony of 
Respondents' witness in regards to the alleged conversation 
with Ray Hansen, accepted the allegation of the witness of 
the Respondents, when the Court made the findings: 
Mr. Ray Hansen agreed to accomodate the 
defendants and did place a series of old 
utility poles along what had before been the 
east fencel ine 'of the right-of-way to prevent 
vehicles from driving onto defendants land or 
onto the right-of-way. These utility poles 
lay in place for approximately two years on 
or about 1961 and 1962. While said utility 
poles were in place, they completely closed 
off any possibility of any vehicular use of 
the 14-foot right-of-way by plaintiffs' 
predecessor in interest. 
The Appellants' Motion for New Trial (R 47-49) sets 
f th A ellants' basl·s for request for ne1·• tr1·a1, and is or pp ' 
supported by Affidavit (R 43-46), which is the sworn 
Affidavit of Ray Hansen as to his illness and inability to 
be present at time of trial, and states that his son, 
· I' was the pr1·or owner of the business known as Wi 111 am 1ansen, 
"Club Somoa", which operated out of the premises now owned 
12 
.. 
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by the Appellants (R 44). The records shows that Hansen had 
a lease upon the premises for the years 1961, 1962, and 
19G3, and was prior to the leasing of the premises by the 
Appellants in 1964. (T 118) 
The Hansen Affidavit states that he was familiar with 
the property for a period of 10 years prior to the leasing 
of the premises and had observed the use of the right-of-way 
for that period of time (R 45), which would have been for a 
period extending back to approximately 1951. 
The Affidavit of Ray Hansen further sets forth that the 
affiant's customers and the affiant used the 14-foot right-
of-way on a regular basis; further that the affiant has 
installed an additional light pole to illuminate the parking 
area, which 1 ight pole was installed by Utah Power & Light 
Company during the period of tenancy of the affiant. The 
affiant further states that the only conversation that he 
had with D' Agni l lo was concerning cleaning up of beer bot-
tles and beer cans, which were thrown onto the area proper 
of the D'Agnillos, and not upon the right-of-way, and the 
affiant did undertake to pick up bottles and beer cans on 
the fenced in area of the servient estate, which did not 
include the 14-foot right-of-way. (R 44-45) 
The affiant further testified that he placed the tele-
phone poles along the fence of the Respondents in order to 
protect the fence from being broken down by cars parking, 
13 
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and that the poles were placed at the edge of the easer.ien: 
property, but did not in any nay interfere with the right-
of-way, and the utilization of the right-of-way, and further 
that the right-of-way was utilized during the entire ti~~ 
affiant for ingress and egress, and for patrons of th< 
business. 
The affiant further stated under oath that for a period 
of 4 1/2 years, he observed the use of the right-of-way i 
days per week on daily basis, and that at all times the 
patrons used the right-of-way at all those times. (R 45) 
The affiant further stated in his Affidavit that ir. 
addition to the use of the right-of-way for patrons ingress, 
egress and parking, that suppliers and local citizens and 
residents in the area used the right-of-way, and that the 
affiant kept the right-of-way filled with gravel, so that 
the area would be passable at all times. (R 46) 
The Appellants through searching deposit ions and inter· 
rogatories, had no knowledge that the Appellants would make 
claims that telephone poles were installed by an occupant of 
the dominant premises to allegedly terminate and prevent the 
use of the right-of-way easement and that the Appellants are 
entitled to a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah 
!1ules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1957, with specific 
reference to 5 9 (a) and § 5 9 ( c) , and s u bm i t to the Court 
holdings of the Court in Fi nan Ci a 1 Credit 
239 P.2d 1002 (Ida. , 1951); Anderson v. ~E!.~~~, 
-------- --
590 P.2d 339 (Utah, 1979). 
14 
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POINT I I I. 
RESPONDENTS HAVE NO RECOP.DED TITLE TO RIGHT-OF-WAY 
CLAI;11ED BY APPELLANTS AND HAVE NOT ACQUIRED RIGHTS 
BY ADVERSE POSSESSION OR BY PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS. 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the deeds 
conveying the properties from 1911 to title in present 
J'.cspondents, excepted from the conveyance the 14-foot 
right-of-way, and that there is no title to said property by 
deed as evidenced by the Exhibits presently before the Court 
showing the continued conveyance of the property of the 
servient estate, with the right-of-way being excepted by 
each conveyance. 
It is further submitted that there is no affirmative 
evidence in the record showing the acquisition by use or 
occupancy of the right-of-way by the Respondents in that no 
such right can vest in the Respondents to said 14-foot 
right-of-way by reason of any claim to such right made by 
the Respondents, either by adverse possession or by 
prescriptive rights; and that the law of the State of Utah 
is specific and clear as to the manner of acquiring right of 
J.civerse possess ion or prescriptive use. see, Richards -v: 
fin~~ ~~!2~!2· ~uri:~; ~ol!i.!2~~i: !~ E:rat;~. supr~; ~uckle:Y v. 
~ox. 247 P.Zd 277; ~ori:is !~ ~lU.!2.!.· 1s1 P.2d, 1121; Dahnken 
~..: ~ori1~~Y. ~uri:,::; ~nd~i:~£!2 ~..: _Qsg~.!_ho_!pe, sup_!~; Rich ins ~ 
:2!~~~~· ~~E~'.:· 
15 
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CONCLOSlON 
I t is therefore submitted to this Honorable Court that 
the record before the Court clearly evidences the establish-
ment of a right by prescriptive use by the Appellants, and 
that the use by the Appellants has been without the 
acquiescence or consent of the Respondents, and that the 
Court shou 1 d award Judgr.ien t on the case to the Appe 11 ants; 
or in the alternative, that the Appellants were wrongfully 
denied the right of re-opening the case for the purpose of 
considering the testimony of Ray Hansen, by reason of sur-
prise in the claims of the Respondents at time of trial, and 
that if this Court does not find that the Appellants are 
entitled to Judgment, that the Court remand the case for 
retrial, so that the testimony of Ray Hansen may be included 
in the record; and that the Court or trier of facts may 
judge the credibi 1 i ty of Ray Hansen as against the testimony 
of the witness who testified in a manner contrary to that of 
Ray Hansen. 
Respectfully submitted this &J-_q-_ day of January, 1981. 
VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP 
( ~ ?~_ -~,7./~-; -- ----~----cS:,-- .--:-J~-.... ·;, -~/./ BY ~_, C·C ·<_/ /. . ~.;;....:..:---
PET~-N~~LAHo~-;'~ 1-1 e-F1rm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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CERT I FI CATE. OF. MA IL ma 
----------------------
HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Qy~ day of January, 
1981, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Brief of Appellants, by placing same in the United 
states ~~ii, postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
PAUL T. KUNZ 
KUNZ, KUNZ & HADLEY 
Suite 300, Bank of Utah Bldg. 
2605 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(Attorney for Defendants 
And Respondents) 
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